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TIMELESSNESS, CREATION, 
AND GOD'S REAL RELATION 
TO THE WORLD 
William Lane Craig 
Talbot School of Theology 
Biola University 
RÉSUMÉ : La question de la relation de Dieu au monde fait difficulté aujourd'hui, tout autant que 
dans la perspective traditionnelle. Elle soulève à neuf la question du temps et de l'éternité et 
appelle un examen approfondi de cette dernière. 
ABSTRACT : The question of God's relation to the world raises a number of difficulties, no easier 
to face today than in the traditional view. It brings up anew the question of time and eternity 
which must be tackled again thoroughly. 
THE OBJECTION TO TIMELESS, DIVINE CREATION 
A great many contemporary thinkers would agree with Nelson Pike's judgement that "A timeless individual could not produce, create, or bring about an object, 
circumstance or state of affairs," since so doing would temporally locate the agent's 
action.1 To be plausible, Pike's claim must be taken in sensu composite, that is to 
say, what is impossible is a timeless being's producing a temporal object. So under-
stood, Pike's claim does seem to raise a significant problem for the contention that it 
may be truly asserted that God is timeless. For it is essential to Christian theism that 
any reality extra Deum is the product of God's creative activity. So if some temporal 
object O begins to exist at a time t, that event is the result of God's action of creating 
O at /. Prima facie the phrase "at f qualifies the gerund "creating," thus dating God's 
creative action. But if there is a time at which God acted to create O, then God's act 
has a temporal location. Since one's acts cannot be divorced from one's being, it 
therefore follows that God has a temporal location, that is to say, He is temporal. 
Opponents of divine timelessness can therefore be understood as claiming that 
1) God is timeless ; and 2) God is creatively active in the temporal world are broadly 
1. Nelson PIKE, God and Timelessness, New York, Schocken Books (coll. "Studies in Ethics and the Philoso-
phy of Religion"), 1970, p. 110 ; Pike's influence is evident on Stephen T. DAVIS, Logic and the Nature of 
God, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1983, p. 13 ; Grace M. JANTZEN, God's World, God's 
Body, with a Foreword by John MacQuarrie, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984, p. 50. 
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logically incompatible, on the basis of the necessary truth of ; 3) if God is creatively 
active in the temporal world, God is really related to the temporal world ; and 4) if 
God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal. 
Since (2) is essential to Christian theism, (1) must be abandoned. 
Why think that (3) and (4) are necessarily true ? With respect to (3), it seems in-
conceivable that God's causal relation to the world and the events/things in it could 
be regarded as anything other than a real relation. Indeed, God's being related to the 
world as cause to effect seems to be a paradigm example of a real relation. As for (4), 
its intuitive basis is the inconceivability of divorcing an agent's being from his ac-
tions or his actions from their effects in such a way that the effects could be temporal 
but the agent timeless. In virtue of the real relation between a cause and its effect, the 
temporality of the effect entails the temporality of the cause as well. 
AQUINAS'S DENIAL 
OF GOD'S REAL RELATION TO THE WORLD 
The classic Thomistic response to the above argument against divine timelessness 
is, remarkably, to deny (3). Aquinas tacitly agrees that if God were really related to 
the temporal world, then He would be temporal, as (4) affirms. As Liske points out, 
in Thomas's view relations between God and creatures, like God's being Lord, first 
begin to exist at that moment of time at which creatures come into being.2 In the 
coming to be of creatures, then, certain relations accrue to God anew and thus, if 
these relations be real for God, He must be temporal in light of his undergoing extrin-
sic change, wholly apart from the question of whether God undergoes intrinsic 
change in creating the world. Contemporary philosophers have tended to overlook 
this fact, focusing the debate on Thomas's contention that God timelessly wills not 
merely His effects but also the times at which those effects appear in the temporal 
series.3 But an examination of the context of Aquinas's remarks on this head reveals 
2. Michael-Thomas LISKE, "Kann Gott reale Beziehungen zu den Geschopfen haben ?," Théologie und 
Philosophie, 68 (1993), p. 224. According to Liske, the reason Thomas resisted recognizing God's real re-
lation to the world is that "Obviously he feared that the mere temporal obtaining of a relation from God, if 
it is real, requires that God Himself must be temporal" (ibid., p. 218). 
3. On this point see THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles 2. 35. 3-5. Liske unfortunately conflates the 
question of God's undergoing relational change in creating with the question of His intrinsically changing 
in creating when he writes : "According to Thomas relational statements which either primarily signify or 
merely connote an actual relation of God to creatures first hold of God from that point of time on at which 
there are creatures (S.t. la. 13. 7 ad 1). It is natural to suppose that these relations therefore first begin to 
hold from a certain point of time on because the absolute reality which grounds them, God's creatorial ac-
tivity, first then begins to work. [...] Since creatures [...] are first brought into being by God's activity, it 
seems impossible that God is already changelessly exercising His creatorial activity, but that the relation to 
creatures first comes to be at a certain point of time. [...] But should we suppose that God actualizes His 
creatorial activity temporally ? But now this surely implies a change in Him" (LISKE, "Reale Beziehun-
gen," p. 224-225). Focusing on the question of whether the act of creating involves intrinsic change in 
God's will or activity to the neglect of Thomas's position on God's real relation to the world are DAVIS, 
Logic and the Nature of God, p. 12-13, and Edward R. WlERENGA, The Nature of God : An Inquiry into 
Divine Attributes, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press (coll. "Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Relig-
ion"), 1989, p. 198. Because he softens Aquinas's doctrine of no real divine relations to the world to mean 
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that his concern there is to explain how God can immutably will a temporal world 
without that world's always existing, that is, without its having an infinite past.4 
Thomas's discussion of philosophical arguments for "the eternity of the world" pre-
supposes a construal of "eternity" as only sempiternity, and thus he speaks of God's 
eternity even in terms that smack of temporality : "Nothing, therefore, prevents our 
saying that God's action existed from all eternity, whereas its effect was not present 
from eternity, but existed at that time when, from all eternity, He ordained it."5 Even 
if successful, Thomas's argument at best shows that God's efficacious will remains 
changeless as the world comes to be and as events successively occur and pass away. 
He says nothing in this context (nor was that his intention) to show how the origin 
and unfolding of a temporal world would not taint the eternal God with temporality in 
virtue of His real relation to the temporal sequence of events changelessly willed by 
Him. 
THOMAS'S VIEW OF GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD 
Aquinas's solution to the problem at hand is quite different : he denies that God 
has any real relation to the world. This prima facie incredible position is rooted in 
Thomas's doctrine of divine simplicity, which is in turn based upon Aquinas's under-
standing of God as ipsum esse subsistens, the unrestricted act of being. In Aquinas's 
understanding, God does not have any nature or essence distinct from His act of ex-
isting.6 For if a thing has an essence distinct from its being, it must have an existen-
tial cause which sustains it in existence. But God, as the Uncaused First Cause, can-
not have a cause, and therefore His nature must be identical with His existence. 
Similarly, any thing having an essence distinct from its existing has by that fact the 
potentiality for existence. But since God, as the Unmoved First Mover, has no poten-
tiality, His essence cannot be other than His existence. Now as the pure act of being, 
not defined by any essence, God is absolutely simple.7 From God's simplicity and the 
utter absence in Him of any potentiality, God's immutability follows,8 and it is on the 
basis of God's immutability that Thomas infers God's timeless eternity : 
merely that God immutably causes the world, Yates is also forced to recur to this theme, yet without ex-
plaining how God's timelessness could be preserved in the face of His real relations with a changing, tem-
poral world (John C. YATES, The Timelessness of God, Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, 
1990, p. 142, 159-160). Incredibly, Harris thinks that "Aquinas chose to ignore the whole problem" (James 
F. HARRIS, "God, Eternality, and the View from Nowhere," in Logic, God, and Metaphysics, Dordrecht, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers [coll. "Studies in Philosophy and Religion," 15], 1992, p. 74) ! Similarly 
oblivious to Aquinas's solution is Richard R. LACROIX, "Aquinas on God's Omnipresence and Timeless-
ness," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42 (1982), p. 391-399. 
4. AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles 2. 32-38. 
5. Ibid., 2. 35. 3. Cf. 2. 35. 5 : "the effect of God's will was not delayed, although having been always willed, 
the effect was not itself always existent [...]. the creature began to exist at that time which God appointed 
from all eternity." 
6. AQUINAS, Summa theologiae la. 3. 4. 
7. Ibid., la. 3. 1-7. 
8. Ibid., la. 9. 1. 
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The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement [...]. 
Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is 
He eternal only, but [...] as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.9 
It is at this point that our objection arises : even if God immutably wills the creation 
of the temporal world, would not the origin of that world, in virtue of God's relation 
to it, bring God into time ? 
Thomas has already implicitly invalidated such a question in his doctrine of di-
vine simplicity. For God's being simple entails, in particular, that God transcends the 
Aristotelian metaphysical distinction between a substance and its accidents. For 
Aquinas accidents are properties which a thing, or substance, may possess either 
contingently or necessarily, but which do not enter into the definition of what the 
thing is, or its essence. Thomas bases his denial of accidents in God squarely on his 
conception of God as being itself or pure actuality : 
[...] accidents cannot exist in God. 
First, because accidents realize some potentialities of their subject, an accident being a 
mode in which the subject achieves actuality. But we have already seen that potentiality is 
to be altogether ruled out from God. 
Secondly, because God is his own existence and [...] you cannot add to existence itself 
[...]. 
Thirdly, because what exists by nature is prior to what exists by accident, so that if God is 
to be the absolutely prime existent, nothing can exist in him by accident. Nor can there be 
accidents in him by nature, as a sense of humor exists in man by nature ; for such acci-
dents are derivative from the essential nature of the subject. In God however there is 
nothing derivative, but all derivation starts from him. We are left to conclude that God 
contains no accidents.10 
The importance of the absence of accidents in God becomes evident when we recall 
that one of the nine categories of accident listed by Aristotle was relation.n Accord-
ing to Thomas's peculiarly Aristotelian metaphysic, relations are actually monadic 
predicates or properties inhering in one or both of the relata. Though a relation might 
be grammatically or logically predicated of both relata, the ontological accident of 
relation might not inhere in both terms of that relation. Aquinas distinguished three 
possibilities in this regard : l) the relation may exist merely in thought, not in the 
things themselves, as is the case with the relation of self-identity ; 2) the relation may 
exist in both things, as in relations of quantity ; 3) the relation may exist in one rela-
tum only, being purely ideal for the other, as in the case of a knower and the object 
9. Ibid., la. 10. 2. Cf. AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles 1.15: "Those beings alone are measured by time that 
are moved. For time [...] is 'the number of motion.' But God [...] is absolutely without motion, and is con-
sequently not measured by time. There is, therefore, no before and after in Him ; [...] nor can any succes-
sion be found in His being. For none of these characteristics can be understood without time. God, there-
fore, is without beginning and end, having His whole being at once. In this consists the nature of eternity." 
10. AQUINAS, Summa theologiae la. 3. 6. 
11. ARISTOTLE, Categories 4.1b25-2a4. Moreover, others of the categories listed involved relations, specifi-
cally time and place. Certain relations, too, might not be confined to a certain category or predicament, but 
characterize all of them and so are called transcendental relations. 
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known.12 In this third case, the relational predicate signifies something real (res natu-
rae) in the one relatum, but only something conceptual (res rationis) for the other. A 
knower K has the real property of knowing object 0 , but O itself does not possess any 
real property of being known by K, as is evident from the fact that O would be intrin-
sically the same if K were non-existent, whereas K would be intrinsically different 
were O not to exist. 
Now since God is simple and lacks all accidents, He cannot possess any relations 
to creatures. Therefore, according to Aquinas, while the temporal world does have the 
real relation of being sustained by God, God does not have a real relation of sustain-
ing the temporal world. This latter relation, while predicated of God, in fact signifies 
only a conceptual relation. Startling as it may sound, God does not have any relations 
of Creator to creature, cause to effect, Savior to saved, and so forth. Aquinas writes : 
Whenever two things are related to each other in such a way that one depends upon the 
other but the other does not depend upon it, there is a real relation in the dependent mem-
ber, but in the independent member the relation is merely one of reason — simply because 
one thing cannot be understood as being related to it. The notion of such a relation be-
comes clear if we consider knowledge, which depends on what is known, although the 
latter does not depend on it. 
Consequently, since all creatures depend on God, but He does not depend on them, there 
are real relations in creatures, referring them to God. The opposite relations in God to 
creatures, however, are merely conceptual relations ; but, because names are signs of con-
cepts, certain names we use for God imply a relation to creatures, even though, as we have 
said, this relation is merely conceptual.13 
The fact that relations between God and creatures inhere only in the latter enables 
Aquinas to avert the objection to divine timelessness based on God's relation to the 
temporal world. He explains : 
[...] whatever receives something anew must be changed, either essentially or acciden-
tally. Now certain relations are predicated of God anew ; for example, that He is Lord or 
governor of this thing which begins to exist anew. Hence, if a relation were predicated of 
God as really existing in Him, it would follow that something accrues to God anew, and 
thus that He is changed either essentially or accidentally ; the contrary of this having been 
proved [...].14 
Since God is immutable, the new relations predicated of Him at the moment of crea-
tion are just in our minds ; in reality the temporal world itself is created with a rela-
tion inhering in it of dependence on God. Hence, God's timelessness is not jeopard-
ized by His creation of a temporal world. 
This unusual doctrine of creation becomes even stranger when we reflect on the 
fact that creating a temporal universe is an act of God and that action, like relation, is 
12. AQUINAS, Summa theologiae la. 13. 7. 
13. AQUINAS, De veritate 4. 5. Cf. Summa theologiae la. 13. 7 ; Summa contra gentiles 2. 11-14 ; Depotentia 
Dei 3. 3. 
14. AQUINAS, Summa contra gentiles 2. 12. 5. Precisely the same solution is offered by Aquinas to the ques-
tion of how the timeless, immutable God can become incarnate in Jesus Christ {Summa theologiae 3ae. 
2.7). 
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one of the nine Aristotelian categories. It would seem to follow that God has no real 
actions and therefore cannot properly be said to have created the world (though the 
world could have under the category of passivity or passion the accident of being 
created by God). Aquinas escapes this conclusion, however, by identifying God's 
action with His power and, hence, with His essence.15 God's act of being is His 
power and His act of creating. Thus, in creating the world God does not perform 
some act extrinsic to His nature ; rather the creature (which undergoes no change but 
simply begins to exist) begins to be with a relation to God of being created by God : 
Taken actively, [creation] denotes the act of God, which is his essence, together with a 
relation to the creature : and this is not a real but only a logical relation. But taken pas-
sively, since [...] it is not properly speaking a change, it must be said to belong, not to the 
genus of passion, but to that of relation [...]. Creation taken actively denotes the divine 
action to which the mind attaches a certain relation [...] : but taken passively, [...] it is a 
real relation signified after the manner of a change on account of the newness or begin-
ning that it implies.16 
According to this doctrine, then, God in freely creating the universe does not really 
do anything different than He would have, had He refrained from creating ; the only 
difference is to be found in the universe itself : instead of God existing alone sans the 
universe we have instead a universe springing into being at the first moment of time 
possessing the property being sustained by God, even though God, for His part, bears 
no real reciprocal relation to the universe made by Him. 
ASSESSMENT OF THOMAS'S POSITION 
Implausibility of the No Real Relation Doctrine 
By way of assessment, I think it has to be said that Thomas's solution, despite its 
daring and ingenuity, is extraordinarily implausible. Wholly apart from the problem-
atic notions of God's essence being identical with His act of being and of God's sim-
plicity, we have this very difficult tenet that while creatures are really related to God, 
God is not really related to creatures. How are we to make sense of this idea ? For 
Aquinas a real relation is one that obtains objectively in the real world ; a mental or 
conceptual relation is one posited by the mind, but having no counterpart in reality. 
Analogously, the distinction between God's will and His existence is not real, but 
conceptual ; or again, we can imagine God prior to the moment of creation, but really 
there was no such prior time.17 Now a real relation is for Aquinas a property inhering 
in a substance. This understanding may seem strange to moderns, since we normally 
conceive of relations as being polyadically, not monadically, predicated. As we con-
ceive relations, it would seem impossible for a real relation to obtain between two 
15. Ibid., 2-9. 5. 
16. AQUINAS, Depotentia Dei 3. 3. Cf. his comment, "Consequently creation is really nothing but a relation of 
the creature to the Creator together with a beginning of existence." 
17. AQUINAS, Summa theologiae la. 19. 2 ; Depotentia Dei 3. 1,2. 
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things without that relation being real for both of them. Nonetheless, Aquinas does 
seem to be onto something important in distinguishing real from conceptual relations. 
In certain cases, the foundation of a relation between two things is constituted by the 
intrinsic properties of only one of the relata. For example, if I resent my boss, then I 
stand in a resentful of relation to him, and he stands in a resented by relation to me. 
But the foundation of these reciprocal relations lies in my intrinsic properties, not in 
those of my boss. This is not to say that my boss has done nothing to cause or merit 
my resentment ; it is simply to say that the relation itself obtains wholly because of 
intrinsic properties I possess, regardless of the source of those feelings. So in a sense, 
a relation can be said to be asymmetrically real if it is founded on intrinsic properties 
of only one of its relata. Perhaps in such a case we could say that the relatum on 
whose intrinsic properties the relation is founded has a real, intrinsic, relational prop-
erty, for example, resenting Jones, but that the other relatum possesses no real, intrin-
sic relational property like resented by Smith. Such a claim seems justified particu-
larly in view of the fact that if Smith were to die, Jones might go on possessing the 
intrinsic property of resenting Smith, whereas if Jones were to die, it would be impos-
sible for Smith to possess the property resented by Jones. But if Smith fails to possess 
that property merely because of Jones's death, which for Smith is an extrinsic change 
only, then resented by Jones is not an intrinsic property possessed by Smith after all. 
Hence, it makes sense to say that among certain relata, not all really possess intrinsic, 
relational properties, though all stand in real relations to one another. Such monadi-
cally predicated properties would come close to what Aquinas understood by rela-
tions as accidents inhering in a substance. 
The question, then, is whether our predicating of God at the moment of creation 
the relational property of sustaining the world is merely conceptual or ascribes a real 
property to Him. "Sustaining" clearly describes a relation which is founded on 
something's intrinsic properties concerning its causal activity, and therefore sustain-
ing the world ought to be regarded as a real property acquired by God at the moment 
of creation. I must confess that I find Aquinas's position, that this property is not 
really possessed by God, but that the relevant real, relational property is being sus-
tained by God, which is possessed by the world, to be quite incredible. If at the mo-
ment of creation the world begins to exist with the relational property being sustained 
by God, then how could God fail to acquire at that very moment the relational prop-
erty sustaining the world 1 Aquinas's own examples seem to betray him here. In the 
cases of knowledge and perception and their objects, the real relation is said to inhere 
in the person knowing and perceiving, not in the objects known and perceived. But 
surely God, as the Creator and Sustainer of the cosmos, is more analogous to the 
person knowing and perceiving than to the objects of his knowledge and perception. 
One need not be a process theologian to find considerable resonance with the senti-
ments of Charles Hartshorne when he writes : 
If, then, God is wholly absolute, a term but never a subject of relations, it follows that God 
does not know or love or will us, his creatures. At most we can say only that we are 
known, loved, and willed by him. Here all analogy fails us. "I am loved by you, but it is 
untrue that you love me" — does this strange combination of words mean anything, even 
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if we suppose them addressed to deity ? All our experience supports the view that the 
cognitive relation, still more obviously, if possible, a relation such as love, is genuinely 
constitutive of the knower or the lover, rather than of the known or the loved.18 
Similarly, with respect to Peter Geach's example of envious o/and envied by as 
indicating real and unreal relations respectively19 ; God as an active agent is much 
more like the jealous person than like the unwitting object of jealousy. What such 
examples seem to miss is the fact that God's relation to the world is a causal relation, 
and it seems fantastic to think that the relation between a cause and its effect is 
analogous to relations like envied by or known by. The universe's dependence upon 
God rather than vice versa seems as little reason for denying to God the real relational 
property of sustaining the cosmos as the dependence of imagined scenes in the 
mind's eye of the artist or day dreamer would be for denying that such persons have a 
real relation to the products of their imagination. If the relation of some cause to its 
effect is unreal, then the cause has in particular no causal relation to its effect ; that is 
to say, the cause is not a cause, which is self-contradictory. All we can say in such a 
case is that the effect is really related to another object or event as the effect of said 
object or event. In truth there is no real cause in such a case, only a real effect. But it 
seems unintelligible, if not contradictory, to say that one can have real effects without 
real causes. Yet this is precisely what Aquinas affirms with respect to God and the 
world. Words like "First Cause" and "Creator" are only extrinsic denominations ap-
plied to God, that is, predicates which do not correspond to any real property but 
which are appropriate in virtue of real properties in creatures. Even if we adopt the 
18. Charles HARTSHORNE, The Divine Relativity, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948, p. 16-17. Hill 
points out that in this discussion the concepts of divine causality, knowledge, and love are entirely analogi-
cal (William J. HILL, "Does the World Make a Difference to God ?," Thomist, 38 [1974], p. 155). It seems 
to me, however, that it is the causal relation between God and creatures which most clearly requires divine 
temporality. For a lucid critique of Hartshorne's extravagant inferences from the reality of divine relations 
to the world, see Merold WESTPHAL, "Temporality and Finitism in Hartshorne's Theism," Review of 
Metaphysics, 19 (1966), p. 550-564. Westphal shows that God's knowing and willing a contingent world 
do not entail that God is subject to change and dependence ; nevertheless, he admits that they do entail that 
God is in some sense contingent (ibid., p. 551), and this suffices to refute the view that God has no real re-
lation to the world. Westphal states that according to Aquinas God possesses in addition to eternal and nec-
essary properties eternal and contingent ones, these latter involving His relation to the world. He com-
ments, "There is no difficulty in harmonizing this with Thomas's assertion of the divine simplicity and his 
denial of divine accidents, for we can and should take these latter to be restricted to God in himself (God 
abstract and unrelated), whereas the contingent and multiple properties of relation belong to the divine be-
ing in relation (God concrete)" (ibid., p. 563). In denying that God is really related to creatures, opines 
Westphal, Thomas is only saying that God is related to creatures in such a way as to render invalid any in-
ference of dependence in him (ibid., p. 564). But this is manifestly untrue, since relations are accidents and 
God, being simple, has no accidents. The doctrine of divine simplicity permits no such distinction within 
God as God abstract and God concrete, except as a conceptual distinction only. As the pure act of being, 
God has no such relations as Westphal imagines, these being extrinsic denominations with no ontological 
correlates. For a discussion of the Auseinandersetzung between Hartshorne and Westphal, see Gene 
REEVES and Delwin BROWN, "The Development of Process Philosophy," in Delwin BROWN, Ralph 
E. JAMES, JR., and Gene REEVES, éd., Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Indianapolis, Bobbs-
Merrill, 1971, p. 45. 
19. Peter GEACH, "God's Relation to the World," in Logic Matters, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1972, p. 321. 
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Thomist view that causation takes place entirely in the effect, not in the cause,20 that 
only underscores the reality of God's causal relation to the world, since the world is 
admitted to be really related to God as effect to cause, to be really caused by God, 
which is all that there is to causality ; nothing more needs to be added ex parte Dei 
for Him to be the cause of the world. Yet Thomism denies that God is literally the 
cause of the world, though the world is the effect of God — which seems contradic-
tory or meaningless.21 
The fact that we are dealing with a causal relationship between God and the 
world makes the present objection to divine timelessness much more powerful than 
similar arguments by Wolterstorff or Smith for the temporal existence of God or 
abstract objects on the basis of changing reference to them by temporal agents.22 For 
clearly, relational properties like worshiped by Jones or referred to by Smith are 
much more akin to relations like envied by or known by than are relational properties 
like sustaining the world and are therefore more plausibly regarded as merely con-
ceptual, not real. Therefore, against Wolterstorff and Smith it might be plausibly 
maintained that God or abstract objects do not really gain and lose relational proper-
ties of the sort mentioned, that the only real, relational properties involved belong to 
temporal agents, and that therefore the acquisition and loss of such properties by such 
agents do not suffice bring God or abstract objects into time. True, such timeless 
entities do change in their relations to temporal things, but it might be plausibly 
maintained that since such change is purely extrinsic it fails to temporalize such enti-
20. William J. HILL explains : "For God to become a cause is quite simply for an effect to begin to be [...]. 
The realness of the transaction lies entirely on the side of the effect, serving as the basis for extrinsically 
denominating God as really causing. Thus for God to really cause is for the effect to really come to be" 
("World Make a Difference to God," p. 156-157). What is not intelligible is why on this account the de-
nomination of God as cause is only extrinsic, were this view not imposed a priori by divine simplicity. 
21. Hence, I find myself constrained to agree with Schubert Ogden when he writes : "Recognizing that the God 
of Holy Scripture is undeniably a God who is related to his creatures, theologians have generally allowed 
that relational concepts may be predicated of deity, provided that they are understood analogically instead 
of literally. The difficulty, however, is that, on conventional metaphysical premisses, to say that God is not 
literally related to the world could only mean that he is literally not related to it ; and so the classical 
analogia entis, like traditional theism in general, has been continually caught in incoherence and self-
contradiction" (Schubert OGDEN, The Reality of God, New York, Harper & Row, 1963, p. 151). Ogden 
errs in contrasting analogical use of terms to literal use ; the contrast to analogical use is univocal use and 
to literal use metaphorical use. Still he is correct that on Thomistic metaphysics God's being Creator, Lord, 
etc. are only extrinsic denominations because God is not related to the world. 
22. Nicholas WOLTERSTORFF, "God Everlasting," in C. ORLEBEKE and L. SMEDES, éd., God and the Good, 
Grand Rapids, Michigan, Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975), p. 186-187 ; Quentin SMITH, Language and Time, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 204-214. For a critique of such arguments, see Charles 
J. KELLY, "Why God Is Not Really Related to the the World," Philosophy Research Archives, 14 (1988-
1989), p. 476. See also Hugh J. MCCANN, "The God beyond Time," in Louis POJMAN, éd., Philosophy of 
Religion, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1993, p. 237, who, however, fails to justify his denying that extrinsic, but 
real, change would be temporalizing. Leftow attempts to circumvent the present argument by maintaining 
that whether or not time exists, the proposition expressed by "God exists" is timelessly true (Brian 
LEFTOW, Time and Eternity, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press [coll. "Cornell Studies in the Philosophy 
of Religion"], 1991, p. 52). He just ignores the issue of whether God can exist timelessly and be really re-
lated to the world. His appeal to the timeless existence of numbers (p. 40-48) is vitiated precisely by the 
fact that numbers, unlike God, have no causal relation to the universe. Moreover, advocates of timeless 
truth hold that there are timelessly true propositions about temporal entities, so that the timeless truth of 
God exists does not imply that God exists timelessly. 
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ties. By contrast, even if God in creating the world does not change in His will or in 
the exercise of His power, He does acquire at the moment of creation a new relational 
property such as sustaining the universe, in virtue of the universe's being newly ef-
fected by Him at that moment.23 Therefore, God must be in time, at least since the 
moment of creation. 
Thomistic Back-Pedaling 
In response to considerations such as the above, many contemporary interpreters 
of St. Thomas have sought to recast Aquinas's doctrine that God has no real relation 
to the world in such a way as to allow that God does have such relations, yet without 
sacrificing His perfection. We need not dispute the claim that God's possessing real 
relations with the world does not entail any increase in His perfection ; but it seems to 
me that such re-interpretations of Aquinas completely gut Thomism and in particular 
undermine the doctrine of divine timelessness. Consider, for example, the construal 
of Aquinas's doctrine advocated by W. Norris Clarke in response to what Hartshorne 
has called "the divine relativity," that is, the idea that God is really related to the 
world in His relations of willing, knowing, and loving creatures. Adopting Aquinas's 
distinction between natural being (esse in re), that is to say, objective existence in the 
world, and intentional being (esse intentionale), that is to say, existence in conscious-
ness as an object of knowledge, Clarke wants to say that God is truly related to the 
world through His intentional consciousness, but that this makes no difference to His 
"real being." He affirms : 
[...] because of His free decision to create this possible world rather than that, to respond 
lovingly to this person in this way rather than that, God's field of intentional conscious-
ness must be determinately and contingently other than it would and could have been had 
He decided in some other way. For free decisions are by definition contingent, could have 
been otherwise, and we should not have the least reluctance to affirm that in its creaturely 
23. We thereby circumvent the issues raised by John Yates in his interesting discussion of timeless causation 
and creation (YATES, Timelessness of God, chap, 5 ; cf. MCCANN, "God beyond Time," p. 238-239). Basi-
cally Yates argues that causation involves no transition from potency to act in the cause, so that changeless 
causing is possible. I should go further and say that causation need not involve any temporal transition 
from potency to act in the effect as well, so that both cause and effect could be timeless. Thus we may 
agree with McCann that causation is not inherently temporal or atemporal. But McCann fails to explain 
why God's willing or causing new effects would not be changes in Him, even though the results of His 
creative activity are not. When it comes to timeless creation of a temporal world, McCann and Yates at 
best show that God's act of creating need not be an intrinsic change in Him, but only an extrinsic change. 
They fail to show that an extrinsic change in God would not suffice to temporalize God. Yates's point that 
creation takes no time only shows that creating lacks temporal extension, not temporal location. What 
Yates (like McCann) needs is a robust doctrine of no real relation of God to the world, but he waffles on 
this (ibid., p. 183). Similarly Liske feels driven to posit real relations of God to the world, but claims that 
the beginning or ceasing to be of a real relation need not temporalize its subject. He says that fatherhood, 
for example, is a real relation based on intrinsic properties of a man, but that this relation can cease to exist 
when the man's only child dies (LISKE, "Reale Beziehungen," p. 223-224). But at best this example only 
shows that God could acquire or lose real relations without any intrinsic change on His part, which I am 
conceding for the sake of argument. 
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intentional objects or terms the divine consciousness is contingently and determinately 
differentiated.24 
Again, "His consciousness, in its intentional content, is distinctly, determinately, and 
contingently differentiated or other with respect to creatures because He has freely 
chosen this world, than it would and could have been had He chosen a different world 
or none at all."25 Clarke thus concedes that God has a relation of personal conscious-
ness {relatio conscientiae personalis) to the world, yet he insists that because this is a 
relation only in the intentional order, it does not affect God's "real being" and so 
cannot strictly be called a real relation. Remarkably, Clarke thinks that he faithfully 
represents Thomas's thinking on this matter since : 
[...] in his strict terminology and theoretical framework such relations cannot be called 
"real relations," since all "real" relations for him require as their foundation some change 
or difference in the real intrinsic ("absolute") being of the subject related — which would 
not be compatible with the divine infinity, allowing, as it does, no increase or diminution 
of its intrinsic plenitude of real perfection. Thus, for St. Thomas, the difference in the di-
vine consciousness as intentionally related to creatures does not thereby entail any change 
in the divine consciousness, let alone the intrinsic real being of God.26 
Clarke's position on how God's relation to time is affected by His relation of per-
sonal consciousness to the world is nebulous. On the one hand, Clarke seems to af-
firm divine atemporal consciousness, writing : 
[...] these relations are not first absent at one moment of time and later present at another, 
but simply present without change in the eternal Now of God present to all points of time. 
This eternal Now is itself outside the flow of our motion-dependent time, but present in its 
own unique time-transcending way to all points of time without internal succession in 
God. Difference (this rather than thai) does not logically imply change (this after that).27 
On the other hand Clarke seems to allow tensed change in God's consciousness, en-
tertaining a model according to which the "divine field of intentional consciousness is 
constantly expanding to match the ongoing evolution of temporal history, in exact 
24. W. Norris CLARKE, "A New Look at the Immutability of God," in Robert J. ROTH, éd., God Knowable and 
Unknowable, New York, Fordham University Press, 1973, p. 55. Cf. William J. HILL, "Does God Know 
the Future ? Aquinas and Some Moderns," Theological Studies, 36 (1975), p. 14 : "In this sphere of inten-
tionality, God determines Himself to be the sort of God He is by choosing to create this existing universe 
rather than any of an infinite number of other worlds possible to Him. This makes no difference to God's 
nature, not to His activity of loving and knowing, but it obviously makes a difference regarding what He 
knows and loves. Had God chosen not to create or to create a different cosmos than the one we have, He 
would in this sense be a different God than He in fact is." See also Mann, "Simplicity and Immutability," 
p. 273-275, who claims that the content of God's knowledge could be different from what it is, but that the 
content of God's omniscience is not identical to His essence ; similarly, not the content of what God wills, 
but God's willing power or activity is His essence. 
25. N. CLARKE, "New Look at Immutability," p. 56. 
26. W. Norris CLARKE, The Philosophical Approach to God, Winston-Salem, NC, Wake Forest University, 
1979, p. 90, summarizing his earlier article. In this second piece, Clarke appears prepared to jettison the 
doctrine of God's having no real relation to the world, but this is appearance only, since the older doctrine 
he still holds to be true ; it is just that the meaning of "real relation" has changed. We shall see that it is 
Clarke who changes the meaning of "real relation" so as to make the traditional doctrine more credible ; 
but in doing so he undercuts not only the classic doctrine, but the core Thomistic conception of God. 
27. Ibid., p. 90. 
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contemporaneity with the latter's ongoing 'now.'"28 Yet because this becoming oc-
curs only in consciousness, God's "intrinsic real being" is said to remain immutable. 
In a later piece, Clarke shows himself even more open to this latter model, positing a 
sort of divine time, distinct from our physically based time, which is founded on "the 
pure succession of contents of consciousness, of'intentional being,' [...] without any 
'moving around' or physical motion inside His own intrinsic being."29 In the unity of 
God's consciousness there is a unique mode of temporal succession somehow corre-
lated with ours. But God's intrinsic being remains immutable and incapable of in-
creased perfection. 
It seems to me painfully apparent that far from faithfully representing the teach-
ing of Aquinas, Clarke has grossly misconstrued and contradicted it, leaving himself 
defenseless against the current objection to divine timelessness. Clarke's distin-
guishing between God's consciousness and God's intrinsic, real being is either spuri-
ous or incompatible with divine simplicity. I am inclined to say that the distinction is 
just spurious, based upon Clarke's confusion of the reality of an object of conscious-
ness with the reality of consciousness of an object. The intentional object itself has no 
objective, independent reality, but certainly God's consciousness is a real and objec-
tive aspect of His being. Hence, it is futile to try to allow God's consciousness to be 
different in various possible worlds without allowing that God is different in different 
possible worlds. But then God has contingent properties with which He is not identi-
cal, so that divine simplicity is destroyed.30 If we insist on His simplicity, then God 
will have the same properties in every world with respect to willing, knowing, and 
loving as He does, so that the price of maintaining divine simplicity is destroying 
divine freedom.31 Indeed, given God's necessary existence, there would be only one 
logically possible world. Since that is absurd, God must have different properties 
across worlds. As Alston points out in his analysis of Hartshorne and Aquinas on this 
score, if we say that God's perfect knowledge would have been different had He 
created some other world, in that He would then have had knowledge of that world 
28. N. CLARKE, "New Look at Immutability," p. 65. So also Hill, who writes : "God becomes what He was not 
— not in Himself but in the world and in history. It is not simply the case that what is other than God 
changes, but rather that God changes — not in Himself but in the other and by way of the other. God 
changes not absolutely but relationally, i.e., in terms of those dispositions of knowing and loving that He 
chooses to adopt toward a universe of creatures that in a finite and temporal way determine themselves" 
(HILL, "God Know the Future," p. 15). I take it that Hill means that God undergoes no intrinsic change in 
His activities, but that as a consequence of extrinsic change in Him due to His relations with temporal 
creatures God is temporal. Being temporal will entail intrinsic change in God, in that He has a changing 
present, but that change is explanatorily posterior to the extrinsic change that brings Him into time. 
29. N. CLARKE, Philosophical Approach to God, p. 94 ; cf. p. 96. 
30. A point made by Alvin PLANTINGA, Does God Have a Nature ?, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 
1980, p. 39-40. Plantinga errs, however, in equating contingently possessed properties with accidental 
properties. 
31. As Hartshorne protested, "It simply cannot be that everything in God is necessary, including his knowledge 
that this world exists, unless the world is in the same sense necessary and there is no contingency what-
ever" (HARTSHORNE, Divine Relativity, p. 14). Cf. OGDEN, Reality of God, p. 17. 
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rather than this, then divine cognitive relations to creatures are partially constitutive 
of God.32 And that entails that God is really related to the world. 
On the other hand, if we do drive a wedge between God's consciousness and His 
immutable nature, then God is not simple. In particular God's knowledge and will are 
not His essence, since these are different from world to world.33 But if God is not 
simple, then the ground is removed for any claim that God does not have real rela-
tions to the world, for that claim was anchored, as we saw, in the divine simplicity.34 
Clarke asserts that divine simplicity only means that there are no really distinct onto-
logical parts making up the absolute divine being and that this does not exclude a 
multiplicity of relations35 ; but this assertion is manifestly untrue, since relations are 
accidents and God, in virtue of His simplicity, is explicitly said to have no accidents. 
Clarke's reinterpretation thus strikes at the very heart of the Thomistic conception of 
God as the unmodified act of being itself. In the end Clarke himself admits that his 
distinction between God's relational being and intrinsic being is artificial and that 
God's inner being is affected by His relations with the world ; Clarke would only 
insist that these bring no improvement to God. We need not dispute this last claim ; 
but now no grounds remain for denying God's real relation to the temporal world. 
Secondly, a word should be added about Clarke's characterization of real rela-
tions, since a number of contemporary thinkers have sought to defend the Thomistic 
solution to the objection under consideration by claiming, as Clarke does, that a nec-
essary condition of a real relation is some intrinsic change in the subject having that 
32. William P. ALSTON, "Hartshorne and Aquinas : A Via Media," in John B. COBB, JR. and Frank-
lin I. GAMWELL, éd., Existence and Actuality, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 83-84. 
33. One cannot save the situation by distinguishing with Mann God's power or activity of willing and knowing 
from what He wills and knows, for power and activity are not identical. Everyone agrees that God has the 
same power across worlds, but this is not to say that God has the same activity across worlds, since activity 
involves the exercising of some power. In worlds in which God does not create, He retains the power to 
create and love creatures, but in such a world He is not exercising that power. Hence, God's activity of cre-
ating and sustaining the universe is not identical with the power to do so, and His activity of loving crea-
tures is not identical with his disposition to love them should He create them. Thus, in worlds in which 
God refrains from creating, He is clearly different than He is in the actual world. Hence, God is not simple. 
34. This is especially clear in AQUINAS'S exposition in Summa contra gentiles 2. 12. 2, where he argues that 
relations which refer to God's effects cannot exist in Him as accidents, since He is simple, nor can they 
(like God's action) be identical with His essence because as relational terms they would make God's very 
being relative to something else ; "Therefore, such relations do not really exist in God." See also 
A.J. KELLY, "God : How Near a Relation ?," Thomist, 34 (1970), p. 216, who affirms that "classical the-
ism, and Thomism in particular, sees no possibility at all in there being any other relation between God and 
the world than that of reason alone. The pitch of the argument lies in the absolute Is-ness of God, the 
sheerly existent One. God cannot be said to acquire a new real relationship to anyone or anything without 
truly denying the ontic absoluteness of the divinity." 
35. N. CLARKE, Philosophical Approach to God, p. 101. Of course, if Clarke's claim were true, then there is 
no bar to real relations accruing to the partless God. Cf. Wright's claim that God has only a relation of rea-
son to creatures because "He gains nothing from them by causing them, no increase in goodness, perfec-
tion, or reality" (John H. WRIGHT, "Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom," Theological Studies, 38 
[1977], p. 456) and Westphal's interpretation than in denying God a real relation to creatures, Thomas is 
only saying that God is related to them in such a way as to render invalid any inference of dependence on 
them (WESTPHAL, "Temporality and Finitism," p. 564). Such watered-down reinterpretations of Aquinas's 
position are a dagger in the heart of Thomism because they contradict God's simplicity, in that He has real 
relations and so is not being itself subsisting. 
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relation. Since the world's beginning to exist is said to be immutably and timelessly 
willed by God, its coming to be involves no intrinsic change in God and hence no 
real relation on God's part to the world. Thus, Peter Geach asserts that the denial that 
God is really related to the world is traditionally bound up with the denial that God 
undergoes change. Contrasting real change to pseudo-change, or what he facetiously 
calls "Cambridge change,"36 Geach takes God's becoming Creator to be merely a 
"Cambridge change" for Him.37 Geach has no criterion for discerning real change, 
and the examples of Cambridge change which he offers are instances of relational 
changes in objects undergoing no change of intrinsic, non-relational properties. Pre-
sumably, then, God at most changes extrinsically in creating a temporal world and so 
is not really related to the world. 
Such reasoning is predicated on an incorrect understanding of real relations. In-
trinsic change in a thing's properties is neither sufficient nor necessary for that 
thing's relation to something else being real.38 Thomas's paradigm example of an 
asymmetric real relation, a knower's relation to the object of knowledge, not only 
implies no intrinsic change, but no extrinsic change either ; indeed, it could be a 
timeless and immutable relation. On the other hand, if the object of knowledge did 
undergo intrinsic change, that would do nothing to make its relation to the knower 
real. Similarly, creation itself is not, in Thomas's lights, any change in the thing cre-
ated, but a sheer beginning to exist with a real relation of dependence on God. If in-
36. Peter GEACH, God and the Soul, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul (coll. "Studies in Ethics and the Phi-
losophy of Religion"), 1969, p. 71-72. The Cambridge criterion for change was : a thing x has changed if 
we have "F(x) at time t" true and then "F(x) at time // ' false. On this account Socrates would change by 
becoming shorter than Theaetetus. 
37. GEACH, "God's Relation to the World," p. 322-323 ; see also ID., God and the Soul, chap. 6. Ct YATES'S 
claim that the denial of a relation in God means only that God is not changed by creation and that in crea-
tion only a "Cambridge" change is involved (YATES, Timelessness of God, p. 183, 141). Although Geach 
thinks thus to have solved the problem of God's causal relation to the world, he does admit to "severe dif-
ficulties" with respect to God's knowledge and will. For in this case there is no real change in the object ; 
so how can the objects of God's knowledge and will be really related to Him and how can He fail to be 
really related to them ? Geach attempts to solve this problem by construing God's knowledge as practical, 
rather than observational, and so, like His will, unchangeable. But even if successful, this move only shows 
God's knowledge and will to be changeless, not unrelated really to the world. Au contraire, the knowledge 
and will by which God governs the world would have to be related to the world, it seems, in order to be ef-
ficacious. 
38. See LlSKE, "Reale Beziehungen," p. 211-112. James F. Ross adopts Geach's terminology in characterizing 
changes and relations, but he recognizes that calling a relation merely a "Cambridge relation" from the 
viewpoint of a certain thing does not imply that the things are so related only in thought, but not in reality ; 
it only implies that from the viewpoint of a given relatum that relatum did not change as a condition of that 
relation's holding (James F. ROSS, "Creation," Journal of Philosophy, 11 [1980], p. 625). Nonetheless, 
Ross misleads in stating that a relation is real from the standpoint of a given relatum just in case that rela-
tum's undergoing a real change is either logically necessary or was logically sufficient for that relation's 
obtaining. There is no reason to think that "real" relations could not obtain between two timeless, immuta-
ble entities, e.g., the logical equivalence of two tenseless propositions. Thus, when Ross asserts, "The rela-
tion 'x creates/ is real from the standpoint of the creatures that begin to be, instead of not being at all, but 
is merely a Cambridge relation from the standpoint of the Creator (whose creation is a constant force)" 
{ibid., p. 626), he falsely opposes "real relation" to "Cambridge relation." Not only does the beginning to 
be of creatures fail to satisfy his (mistaken) definition of "real relation" (since beginning to exist is not a 
change), but there are no grounds for contrasting a real relation with a Cambridge relation anyway, since 
the latter may be just as much a part of objective reality as the former, even though one relatum did not 
change. 
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trinsic change were a necessary condition of real relations, then God and the event of 
creation do not stand in any real relation at all, whether from the side of the creature 
or of God, which is absurd. 
The immutability of God's will, knowledge, and love in relation to creatures is 
thus wholly beside the point with respect to the question of God's real relation to the 
world.39 The issue is not intrinsic change, but intrinsic (counterfactual) difference : if 
a world of other creatures were actual, would God's will, knowledge, and love rela-
tionships be different ? If we affirm this, then God has different intrinsic properties 
from world to world and so real relations with the creatures willed, known, and loved 
by Him. As Hill admits : 
[...] somehow or other God with a creation and God without it are not entirely the same 
thing, and it appears overly facile to dismiss this as exclusively on the side of the creature. 
There remains the possibility of intrinsic differences in God's knowing and loving, differ-
ences which need not bespeak any transmutation of his being. No entitative transition 
from not-knowing to knowing or from not-loving to loving is implied.40 
To be sure, God's being different in will, knowledge, and love across various possi-
ble worlds is ultimately due to His own free decree as to what sort of creatures to 
create. But the dependence of which creatures are actual upon God only shows that 
God's relation to creatures is freely chosen by Him, not that that relation is unreal. 
Again Hill makes the point : 
God does freely determine himself to know and love this actual world rather than any of 
the other infinite number of possible worlds [...]. Ultimately, God is choosing, in unquali-
fied freedom, to so specify himself. But the point is that there occurs a determination 
within God as knowing and loving, on which basis he is other, relatively speaking, than he 
would be had he determined himself in some other way.41 
Wholly apart from the question of intrinsic change on God's part, then, the admission 
that God is intrinsically different in different possible worlds, in that what He knows, 
wills, and loves is diverse across worlds, demonstrates that His relation with creatures 
39. The confusion of impassibility with immutability also besets Richard Creel's treatment of these problems 
in Richard E. CREEL, Divine Impassibility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986. For example, 
Creel admits that God's knowledge is conditioned by whatever world is actual, but he denies that this im-
plies passibility in God because passibility is vulnerability to change induced by something distinct from 
that in which the change takes place (ibid., p. 82). This is a wholly different conception of what it is to be 
impassible as he defined it on p. 11 : imperviousness to causal influence from external factors or incapacity 
to be affected by an outside force. (N.B. even these disjuncts are not equivalent !) There is no reason to 
think that "being causally influenced" entails "being vulnerable to change" or, better that "being condi-
tioned" entails "being vulnerable to change." If God's knowledge consists wholly of tenselessly true be-
liefs about the world, then it could be immutable and yet passable in that it is conditioned by which world 
is actual. Similarly, if, as Creel suggests, what God wills is tenseless and time-indexed, then it can be im-
mutable (ibid., p. 19) ; but, pace Creel, it is still conditioned in the sense that God wills an event e at t2 in 
the actual world, but not in W*, because in the actual world some earlier event e ' occurs at t„ whereas e ' 
does not occur at t, in W*. Thus, Creel is wrong when he asserts that "a passible being could not be immu-
table" (ibid., p. 11). 
40. HILL, "World Make a Difference to God," p. 157. Cf. LISKE, "Reale Beziehungen," p. 227, who trembles 
on the verge of admitting that the world makes a counterfactual difference to God, but pulls back because 
he believes that this would sacrifice God's absoluteness and make God a part of the universe — a pity he 
did not know WESTPHAL, "Temporality and Finitism," p. 550-564. 
41. HILL, "World Make a Difference to God," p. 157. 
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is not merely conceptual, all the diversity residing in the creatures alone, but real 
because it is founded in intrinsic properties of God Himself. But if God has real rela-
tions with the temporal universe, no reason remains for denying God's temporality, 
even if His becoming Creator is a "Cambridge" change. For even extrinsic change 
can be sufficient for real relations. In Geach's example of Socrates' becoming shorter 
than Theaetetus due to the latter's growth, only Theaetetus undergoes intrinsic 
change, but Socrates's being shorter than Theaetetus as a result of that change is still 
a real relation. With respect to creation, we have conceded for argument's sake that 
God's creating the world is not the consequence of an intrinsic change on His part. 
Accordingly, His becoming Creator could be construed as a "Cambridge" change, 
resulting from the universe's springing into being. But it does not follow that the 
relation which accrues to God as a result is therefore unreal, since intrinsic change is 
not a necessary condition of a real relation. Even if God is conceived to be timeless 
sans creation, so that He cannot properly be said to change (even extrinsically) in 
virtue of the new relation He acquires at the first moment of time, still the newness of 
that relation suffices to bring Him into time. 
Would-be defenders of Thomism who seek to soften Aquinas's position so as to 
allow God real relations to the world under the condition that God's perfection and 
causal independence be maintained actually destroy Thomism, for they thereby sacri-
fice God's simplicity, the identity of His essence with His pure act of being, and di-
vine atemporality. 
God's Trans-World Similarity 
Actually, Aquinas has a quite different way of eluding the dilemma of God's 
knowledge, will, and love's either being identical with His essence, thereby removing 
divine freedom and contingency, or else being accidental to Him, thereby destroying 
divine simplicity and His unrelatedness to the world. What Hartshorne uncritically 
presupposed is that God knows, wills, and loves the world. But this is precisely what 
Aquinas's doctrine of no real relation of God to the world denies. Bizarre as it may 
sound, it is the implication of Aquinas's position that God is perfectly similar across 
possible worlds, even the same in worlds in which He refrains from creation as in 
worlds in which He creates. As Zagzebski explains : 
Since the primary object of God's knowledge is his own essence, and since his essence 
could not have been different, it follows that God's mental state of knowing is the same in 
all possible worlds. His knowing state would have been the same state even, in fact, if he 
had decided not to create a world at all.42 
42. Linda T. ZAGZEBSKI, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1991, p. 88. By "knowing state" Zagzebski evidently means cognitive state, since she affirms that God's 
knowledge does vary across worlds ; i.e., the same divine cognitive state is God's knowing/? in one world 
and His knowing not-p in another. According to Zagzebski, "the single state of knowing his own essence 
that constitutes God's epistemic state in all possible worlds has the accidental property of secondarily 
knowing one set of contingent truths in one world and another set of contingent truths in another world" 
{ibid., p. 89). Dependent as it is on the doctrine of divine simplicity, Thomas Flint dismisses this position 
as "less than promising" (Thomas P. FLINT, "Critical notice of The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowl-
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For in none of these worlds does God have any relation to anything extra se. In all 
these worlds God never acts differently, He never cognizes differently, He never 
wills differently ; He is just the simple, unrelated act of being. 
Of course, in these various worlds different creatures have the accidents of being 
sustained, known, and loved by God. The entire difference between worlds is to be 
found there, on the side of creatures.43 But that brings us back to Aquinas's doctrine 
of creation, which I previously characterized as unusually strange. In every world 
God exists in every respect the same. Even in worlds in which He does not create, 
His act of being, by which creation is produced, is no different in these otherwise 
empty worlds than in worlds chock-full of contingent beings of every order. The only 
difference is that in worlds in which God creates there is, from God's perspective, 
that relatio rationis to finite things.44 
The notion that God is no different whether He creates or does not create and that 
the difference between these two alternatives lies wholly in the created being meshes 
nicely with the Thomistic understanding of efficient causality. Since the categories of 
action and passion (passivity) are taken to be identical in the real order and only con-
ceptually distinct, causation is conceived to reside wholly in the effect produced, not 
in the cause. Clarke explains : 
The action of the agent is shown to consist, not in any change or motion in the agent, but 
in the very production of the effect in the patient, or the effect itself as being produced. 
The productive action of the cause, therefore, takes place, properly speaking, not within 
the cause but within the patient : it is the emergence of the effect itself as from/or due to 
the cause. Hence, the action and the passion, the producing and the being produced, are 
edge" Faith and Philosophy, 11 [1994], p. 484) ; indeed, it seems to me that Zagzebski's position is self-
contradictory. For as a simple being God cannot have the envisioned property, much less have it acciden-
tally, since ex hypothesi God is the same across possible worlds. 
43. One of the few consistent Thomists is thus Charles J. KELLY, "Why God Is Not Really Related to the 
World," Philosophy Research Archives, 14 (1988-1989), p. 472 ; cf. ID., "The Logic of Eternal Knowledge 
from the Standpoint of the Aristotelian Syllogistic," Modern Schoolman, 66 (1988), p. 29-54. But Kelly is 
content merely to examine the logic of statements ostensibly predicating real relations of God and to re-
state accurately Aquinas's position that nothing can be predicated of God other than an activity which be-
long exclusively and necessarily to Him, so that all such relations really lodge in creatures. But Kelly does 
nothing to render this position credible. He does claim that propositions which are equivalent in the active 
and passive voices retain the same logical subject ; so if "was created by God" expresses a real relation in 
the world, then "created the world" cannot express a real relation in God ("Why God Is Not Really Re-
lated," p. 464). But this assertion is obviously false in the case of causal relations. In "John hit the ball" and 
"The ball was hit by John," there is no reason to take the logical subject as being the same or to infer that 
even if it were, only one term is really related to the other. For some discussion of Kelly's analysis of 
statements predicating real relations of God, see James E. TAYLOR, "Kelly on the Logic of Eternal Knowl-
edge," Modern Schoolman, 67 (1990), p. 141-147 ; Charles J. KELLY, "On the Logic of Eternal Knowl-
edge : A Rejoinder," Modern Schoolman, 68 (1991), p. 163-169. 
44. Yates expresses the doctrine straightforwardly : "Creation [...] actively considered is only a logical rela-
tion. The divine power is God himself. When God creates he does nothing else than to be God. The being 
of creating is not posited in God as though it were God plus something else [...]. That God creates, and 
conserves, makes an absolute difference to the creature and no difference to God. This is not a mere corol-
lary of the relationship of creation but its very essence" (YATES, Timelessness of God, p. 181). Since God 
exists in every possible world it is inexplicable why creation does not take place in every world. 
Cf. OGDEN, Reality of God, p. 17. It is no wonder that Alston cheers Hartshorne for having helped to make 
the traditional doctrine of creation more attractive, plausible, and coherent than it was in the Thomistic 
framework ! 
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strictly identical in the real order and ontologically located in the subject affected. They 
are distinguished conceptually, however, in terms of the relations involved. Action is the 
effect-being-produced considered as from/or due to the agent. Passion is the identical ef-
fect considered as received or residing in the patient. Causing and being caused are not, 
therefore, two events, one taking place in the agent and the other in the patient. They con-
stitute a single ontological event.45 
Given such an understanding of causation, one can perhaps make sense of the view 
that the difference between God's causing or not causing the universe lies entirely in 
the universe itself and not in God. God's creating the universe just is the universe's 
beginning to be with the accidental property of being caused by God. 
In the end, however, Thomas's doctrine of creation is just not credible. The Tho-
mistic analysis of causation seems implausible in light of our own experience as 
causes. So long as we consider external causes, we can give Thomas's analysis a run 
for its money : the brick shattering the glass, for example, is in reality just the shat-
tering of the glass by the brick. But once we consider ourselves introspectively as 
agent causes, the ontological identity of action and passion becomes implausible. 
Causing and being caused by are not just inert relations : causing is an activity, and 
as such lodges in the agent. When we act as causes, we experience action as some-
thing we do. That is not the case with the passive being caused. The reality of our 
experience of ourselves as causal agents belies the claim that action and passion are 
only conceptually, not really, distinct. Since God is an agent, the action of creating 
must be something attributable to Him, not just to His effects as produced. 
In any case, even if action and passion were identical in reality, it still does not 
make good sense to say that in any instance of causation one has passion without any 
action. That would be to say that the effect is produced by nothing, which is analyti-
cally false. But in the creation of the universe, that is exactly the situation on Tho-
mas's view. We have a passion being produced but no action producing, a real effect 
but no real cause. It might be said that technically speaking in creation we have no 
passion either, since there is no subject to receive the act of being. But then it would 
follow that creation is not an instance of causation at all, which only serves to cast 
doubt on the definition of "causation" employed. Creation is enough like causation to 
warrant our demanding that if there is a real creature, then there is a real Creator. 
Wholly apart from the analysis of causation, however, Thomas's doctrine of 
creation makes it unintelligible why the universe exists rather than nothing. The rea-
son obviously cannot lie in God, either in His nature or His activity (which are only 
conceptually distinct anyway), for these are perfectly similar in every possible world. 
Nor can the reason lie in the creatures themselves, in that they have a real relation to 
God of being freely willed by God. For their existing with that relation cannot be 
explanatorily prior to their existing with that relation. What is wanted is something 
posterior to God in the order of explanation but prior to the existence of creatures 
45. W. Norris CLARKE, "Causality and Time," in Experience, Existence, and the Good, Carbondale, Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1961, p. 146 ; cf. ID., "New Look at Immutability," p. 51. 
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really related to God. But in Thomas's system there is an explanatory lacuna in that 
middle position. 
Few contemporary interpreters of St. Thomas have faced this issue squarely. John 
Wright does, and he finds himself forced to conclude that : 
[...] we can't say that "Creator" is wholly and simply a matter of extrinsic denomination 
founded on the reality of an extrinsic denomination, that is, of creatures. It will not do be-
cause the reality of creatures and of their dependence presupposes, not merely logically 
but ontologically, the activity of God as determined to produce creatures and to produce 
these rather than some other possible creatures. We may call this determination what we 
like, but we cannot reduce it merely to a posterior construction of the human mind. To do 
so would be to make the actual existence of the world either absurd or independent of God 
(since then there is objectively nothing in the divine activity, no reason at all why crea-
tures exist rather than not exist, or these creatures rather than some other possible ones) or 
else to make it the inevitable consequence of necessary divine activity.46 
Making the existence of the universe the inevitable consequence of divine activity 
results from saying that the reason the universe exists is due to the simple essence of 
God ; making the existence of the universe independent of God results from saying 
that there is no reason why creatures exist rather than nothing ; and making the exis-
tence of the universe absurd results from Thomism, saying that God has no real rela-
tion to the world, but the world has a real relation to God. 
I conclude, then, that the escape from the present objection advocated by Tho-
mists, namely, denying the truth of (3), ultimately leads to absurdity and so must be 
rejected. 
A WAY OUT FOR ADVOCATES OF DIVINE TIMELESSNESS ? 
One possible way of escape for defenders of divine timelessness does remain : 
deny the objectivity of tense and temporal becoming and therefore also the (neces-
sary) truth of : 4) if God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal. If 
one embraces (to borrow McTasggart's convenient terminology) a B-Theory of time, 
according to which there are no tensed facts and temporal becoming is merely a sub-
jective feature of consciousness, then the argument is undercut. For in that case all 
events comprising the four-dimensional space-time manifold simply exist tenselessly, 
and God can be conceived to exist "outside" this manifold, spacelessly and time-
lessly.47 Given a B-Theory of time, God either exists tenselessly without creation or 
46. WRIGHT, "Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom," p. 457. Wright gives a half-hearted attempt to justify 
the denial of real relations in God by insisting that creatures are not the ultimate term of the relation ; since 
they are relative to God, God regards them as such, so that He is the ultimate term of the relation. But this 
defense is meritless : the relation of sustaining which God has to the universe is asymmetric and so termi-
nates in creatures ; another relation links them back to God. In the end Wright accepts real relations in 
God, only insisting that these do not affect the divine perfection (ibid., p. 460-461). Aquinas's solution be-
comes especially fantastic when we recall that he also employs it to explain the incarnation of the second 
person of the Trinity as Jesus of Nazareth, for it is incredible to imagine that God in worlds in which the 
Son does not become incarnate is precisely the same as in worlds in which He does. 
47. As Denbigh puts it, "The B-series is as if the Deity could timelessly witness all events, laid out in order 
along the time coordinate, as we can witness objects laid out in space" (K.G. DENBIGH, An Inventive Uni-
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co-exists tenselessly with creation, depending upon the free decree of His will, but no 
world includes both states of affairs. Thus, God, in creating the world, enters into no 
new relations whatsoever. He tenselessly stands in the relation of creating the Big 
Bang at t0. The date t0 indicates, not the time of His acting, but the time of the effect. 
God does not come into the relation Creator o/with the Big Bang singularity at t0 and 
then cease to stand in this relation to it at /; ; rather He timelessly stands in the Crea-
tor of relation to all events at their respective times. By a single, timeless act God 
tenselessly produces events at t0, th t2, ... Thus, on the B-theory of time, one can 
successfully divorce God's action from its effects in such a way that the action is 
timeless and the effects temporal. By denying the reality of temporal becoming and 
tensed facts, the advocate of divine timelessness undercuts premiss (4), thereby al-
lowing one to maintain God's atemporality and His creative activity in the temporal 
world without denying God's real relation to that world. In fact, as I have elsewhere 
argued, many of the statements of classical advocates of divine atemporality seem to 
presuppose just such a B-Theory of time.48 
The bottom line to our discussion of the objection to divine timelessness based on 
God's creation of the world is therefore that this objection is cogent just in case an A-
Theory of time is correct. If this conclusion is correct, then significant advance of the 
discussion of the nature of divine eternity in light of creation can only take place by 
tackling the difficult and multi-faceted problem of the A- versus B-Theory of time. 
verse, London, Hutchinson, 1975, p. 30-31). Cf. Keith SEDDON, Time : a Philosophical Treatment, Lon-
don, Croon Helm, 1987, p. 135. 
48. See William Lane CRAIG, "Was Thomas Aquinas a B-Theorist of Time ?," New Scholasticism, 59 (1985), 
p. 475-483 ; ID., "St. Anselm on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingency," Laval Théologique et 
Philosophique, 42 (1986), p. 93-104. 
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